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Moldovos pastangos susivienyti su Rumunija 1991-1992-aisiais metais parode, jog Sitas uidavinys 
veliau buvo pertvarkytas j siekimq sukurti etninq-teritorinq federacijq. Ukrainoje privilegijuotq 
rusy padetj pakeite konsocionalizmo principai, kai rusai ir ukrainai tolygiai pasidalijo valdiiq Salyje. 
Abstract 
b The collapse of the USSR resulted in a de- 
cline of institutions which had supported the 
dominance of ethnic Russians throughout the 
periphery of the country. In their place new 
institutions and mechanisms have been devel- 
oped to regulate the access of people of differ- 
ent nationalities to power, resources and pres- 
tige. This paper provides a comparative analy- 
sis of ethnic transformation in 10 of the 14 suc- 
cessor states of the former Soviet Union. The 
analysis identified five types of ethnic transfor- 
mation in the successor states. In the Baltics 
the attempts of titular ethnic groups to secure 
predominance over ethnic Russians and radi- 
cally transform institutions of the Soviet state 
resulted in the creation of exclusive ethnic de- 
mocracies. In Central Asia an elite-negotiated 
t ransformat ion led to  t he  emergence of 
ethnocracies in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan, while the  regimes formed in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were characterized 
by a mixture of ethnocratic and consociationalist 
features. In Moldova a failed attempt at unifi- 
cation with Romania eventuated in policies di- 
rected toward the creation of a Moldovan ethno- 
territorial federation. Finally, in Ukraine 
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gradual reforms and attempts to abolish any eth- 
nic hierarchy have led to  the creation of 
consociationalism, in which ethnic Russians and 
Ukrainians, Russophones and Ukrainophones 
share power over the state. 
Key wordsRussian minorities; ethnic trans- 
formation; Baltic states; Central Asia; Moldova; 
Ukraine; successor states of the former USSR. 
Introduction 
During this century the populations of the 
non-Russian territories of the USSR went 
through two periods of radical change: adapta- 
tion to Russian dominance within the Soviet 
Union and a withdrawal from it. In each of these 
cases of systemic transformation, the problem 
of ethnic stratification has raised a number of 
empirical and theoretical questions.' The Bol- 
shevik consolidation of power during the 1920s 
precipitated the debate concerning the likeli- 
hood that the destruction of Czarist Russia and 
attempts to build socialism would lead to a de- 
cline in the importance of ethnicity in the USSR. 
Official Moscow claimed that the creation of 
state socialism had resulted in the emergence 
of a 'Soviet nation,' purportedly built on class 
rather than ethnic characteristics. Opponents 
of the Communist regime insisted that the So- 
viet Union was essentially a re-creation of the 
Russian Empire under the guise of Marxist ide- 
ology. 
By the early 1960s, the number of intellec- 
tuals taking extreme positions in the debate over 
the nature of ethnic stratification in the USSR 
had declined. This occurred because Moscow, 
by using repression as well as cooptation, ap- 
peared successful in pacifying ethnic groups 
populating the periphery of the country. There- 
fore, the majority of sociologists, anthropolo- 
gists, and political scientists adopted a 'melting 
pot' paradigm. The primary task of social re- 
search conducted under this framework was to 
estimate the degree to which the 'Soviet nation' 
was becoming ethnically integrated through the 
migration, assimilation and acculturation of 
non-Russians into the Russian nation (Motyl 
1992). 
By the mid-1980s' with the rise of ethnic un- 
rest in the USSR, the focus of ethnic studies 
began once again to change. The 'melting pot' 
paradigm was rapidly replaced by what may be 
called a 'deviation from the ideal condition' 
model. This new approach was based on the 
assumption that Soviet society was undergoing 
a fundamental transition which entailed change 
from a dictatorship into a democracy, from a 
command economy into a market economy, and 
from an Empire to nation states (Yergin and 
Gustafson 1993). The purpose of the studies 
conducted under the ''deviational" framework 
was to measure (a) the degree to which politi- 
cal institutions in the successor states resemble 
institutions of liberal democratic states (e.g., in 
terms of civic and human rights protection and 
provision for the cultural rights of ethnic mi- 
norities) (Brzezinski 1989; Buttino 1992; 
Lapidus 1992), (b) the potential of ethnic con- 
flict (Drobizheva et al. 1996; Etinger 1994; 
Lieven and McGarry 1993; Tishkov 1991; 
Zdravomyslov 1997), and (c) the level of 'mis- 
match' between the political and cultural bound- 
aries of the new states and ethnic groups that 
populate them (Chinn and Kaiser 1996; Kolstoe 
1995; Lewis 1992; Shlapentokh et al. 1994). 
However, by the mid-1990s deviational 
models in post-Soviet ethnic studies were in- 
creasingly subjected to criticism. It was argued 
that such an approach was too ideological be- 
cause it assumed that the extremely complex so- 
cial, economic and political processes evolving 
on the Eurasian continent had uniform goals 
and direction. Some critics argued that the no- 
tion of transition should be altogether aban- 
doned (Lewis, 1995). Instead of a transition, 
changes in ethnic stratification should be inter- 
preted as an open-ended process, 'in which the 
introduction of the new elements takes place 
most typically with adaptations, rearrange- 
ments, permutations, and recombination of al- 
ready existing institutional forms' (Bryant and 
Mokrzycki 1994, p.4). 
This paper attempts to develop an alterna- 
tive model to the deviational approach that al- 
lows for the systemic characterization of the 
Socialines tapatybes klausimai 
emerging ethno-political systems in the post-So- 
viet states. Instead of a one-dimensional pro- 
cess, the process of ethnic transformation is con- 
ceptualized as occurring within a grid comprised 
of four overlapping 'ideal types' of ethno-po- 
litical systems: the consociational regime, eth- 
nic authoritarian regime, ethnic (or exclusive) 
democracy and liberal democracy. Such a 
conceptualization makes it possible to charac- 
terize the process of ethnic transformation in 
each of the ex-Soviet states as a trajectory on 
the above-described grid. This approach has 
significant advantages over the deviational 
model in that it can account for more than just 
'forward' movement in the process of ethnic 
transformation, (e.g., the case of transformation 
from an Empire into a liberal-democratic state). 
It also allows for the characterization of 'back- 
ward' shifts in ethnic transformation (e.g., shifts 
to primitive ethnocracies), as well as movements 
'sideways' toward the creation of a variety of 
'hybrid' ethnic orders (e.g., shifts to forms that 
are a mixture of elements of traditional, Soviet, 
and new institutions). 
In this paper the ethnic transformations in 
10 national republics of the former USSR are 
analyzed. These include Ukraine, M o l d o ~ a , ~  
the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, and the five Central Asian states of 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These 10 repub- 
lics account for more than 90% (23 million) of 
ethnic Russian and Russophone population3 
that by the late 1980s lived in non-Russian re- 
publics of the USSR. Ethnic Russians consti- 
tuted more than one-third of the population in 
Latvia and Kazakhstan, about 30% in Estonia, 
20% in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, 13% in 
Moldova and 10% in Lithuania, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Harris 1993). 
The interaction of two types of factors is 
used to explain the changes in the ethno-politi- 
cal order in the national republics of the former 
USSR: structural and strategic. Structural fac- 
tors refer to the character of ethnic stratifica- 
tion as it emerged across the periphery of the 
USSR by the early 1980s. This paper argues 
that the wide variety of patterns of ethnic strati- 
I 
: 
fication evolved as a result of the incorporation, 
conquest, modernization, social and cultural 
policies pursued by Moscow in the national re- 
publics of the USSR. These patterns of ethnic 
stratification varied in character from rigid-com- 
petitive stratification in Central Asia, to bipo- 
lar stratification in the Baltics, and fluid-com- 
petitive ethnic stratification in Ukraine. 
The strategic dimension refers to actions 
taken by groups and individuals engaged in con- 
testation over the old ethnic rules and negotia- 
tion over the new ethnic order. Following 
Brubaker (1995), the interaction of three par- 
ties in negotiations over the new ethnic order 
are analyzed. First, the emerging new ethnic 
order in the national republics are influenced 
by the actions of local Russian populations. 
Second, ethnic transformation also depends on 
the actions taken by the newly created 'nation- 
alizing states, ethnically heterogenous yet con- 
ceived as nation-states, whose dominant elites 
promote (to varying degree) the language, cul- 
ture, demographic position, economic flourish- 
ing and political hegemony of the nominally 
state-bearing nation' (Brubaker 1995, p.109). 
Finally, how power, status and resources are 
distributed among ethnic groups depends on the 
involvement of the Russian Federation in eth- 
nic politics in the ex-Soviet republics. 
This paper argues that the interaction of 
strategic and structural factors has produced five 
types of ethnic transformation in the republics 
of the former USSR. In the Baltics attempts by 
titular ethnic groups to secure predominance 
and to radically transform the institutions of the 
Soviet state resulted in the creation of 'ethnic 
democracies.' In Central Asia the elite-negoti- 
ated transformation led to the emergence of 
ethnocratic regimes in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan, while the regimes were formed 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that were char- 
acterized by a mixture of ethnocratic and 
consociationalist features. In Moldova a failed 
attempt at unification with Romania eventuated 
in policies directed toward the creation of a 
Moldovan ethno-territorial federation. Finally, 
in Ukraine gradual reforms and attempts to 
abolish any ethnic hierarchy have led to the cre- 
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ation of consociationalism, in which ethnic Rus- 
sians and Ukrainians,  Russophones and 
Ukrainophones share power over the state. 
This paper is organized to first present an 
outline of the model used for the analysis of eth- 
nic transformation in the new ex-Soviet states. 
The patterns of ethnic stratification which 
evolved during with the late socialism period in 
the national republics of the USSR are then de- 
scribed. The empirical part of the paper ana- 
lyzes the ethnic transformation in four regions 
of the former USSR (Baltics, Central Asia, 
Ukraine and Moldova). The paper concludes 
with some general remarks on the theoretical 
implications of the proposed approach to the 
study of an ethnic transformation process in the 
successor states of the USSR. 
Ethnic -ansforma tion 
and Its Outcomes 
When, Moscow's control over the periph- 
ery started to decline by the late 1980s, non- 
Russian ethnic groups began to contest the 
domination of ethnic Russians in their native 
homelands. Increasingly, demands were made 
to redistribute access to power, resources and 
status among ethnic groups. Under the trans- 
formation model proposed in this paper, the 
ethno-political changes can be described by the 
intersection of two dimensions: the mode and 
direction of ethnic transformation. The model 
(Figure 1) describes the types of ethnopolitical 
systems likely to emerge as a result of the de- 
cline of Russian domination. According to the 
model, four ideal types of ethno-political sys- 
tems can result from the ethnic transformation 
process: ethnic democracy, ethnic autocratic re- 
gime, consociational regime and liberal democ- 
racy. 
An elite-based ethnic transformation would 
occur if there were changes in the ethnic com- 
position of the elites, and the hierarchical and 
centralized institutions of the Soviet state re- 
main unaltered and intact. Depending on the 
direction of ethnic hierarchy transformation, 
two kinds of elite-based ethnic transformation 
can occur (Figure 1, quadrants I and IV). Imple- 
mentation of the "nationalizing policies" within 
unreformed Soviet economic and social insti- 
tutions would lead to creation of an ethnic au- 
thoritarian regime. Under an ethnic authori- 
tarian regime, ethnic Russians occupying posi- 
tions of privilege and power would be replaced 
by individuals of the titular nationality, while 
power would be concentrated in the hands of 
an eponymous elite that would not be constitu- 
tionally responsible to the people. 
Figure 1. Direction, modes of ethnic smrcrure transformation, and character of efhno-political systems in the sticcessor states of the former 
USSR 
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I If multiethnic elites agree to share power in 
, the successor states, then ethnic transformation 
' would produce a consociational regime 
(Lijphart 1968; 1977). Consociationalism de- 
velops in ethnically divided societies when none 
1 of the elites from different ethnic groups have 
enough resources or power to subordinate other 
ethnic groups, and when each ethnic group 
needs their opponent's resources for their own 
survival. ) Reforms-based ethnic transformation refers 
i to efforts at changing the institutions of the So- 
viet state that had produced a hierarchy of eth- 
nic groups. In the political sphere, such reforms 
would result in reorganization of the polities 
under the principles of liberal democracy, (e.g., 
the institutionalization of political pluralism and 
I rule of law, and the provision of civil and politi- 
cal rights for the citizens). In the economic 
sphere, reforms would be directed toward trans- 
formation of the centralized planning system 
into a market-based economy. In the sphere of 
ethnic relations, reforms would attempt to (a) 
curtail the policies of forceful nativization and 
assimilation, (b) provide for the protection of 
ethnic minorities against discrimination, while 
also (c) creating conditions for the preservation 
of their cultural uniqueness. 
Depending on the direction of ethnic hier- 
archy change, reform-based ethnic transforma- 
tion can lead to the establishment of one of two 
types of ethno-political systems (Figure 1, quad- 
rants I1 and 111). If the reforms result in a de- 
mocracy for one ethnic group, while members 
of other ethnic groups are excluded from par- 
ticipation in the polity, economy, or social life 
of the society, then a system of 'ethnic democ- 
racy' would evolve in the successor states of the 
USSR. 
Ethnic democracy, in its milder forms, de- 
nies some political, economic or civil rights to 
the individual based on their ethnic origins (e.g., 
the right to vote in national elections, hold pub- 
lic office, or participate in the privatization of 
state property, etc.) An extreme ethnic democ- 
racy can evolve into an 'ethnic apartheid,' a po- 
litical system based on ethnic segregation. 
If the reform of Soviet institutions was also 
directed toward abolition of ethnic hierarchy 
and the establishment of a political system based 
on the rights of the individual (e.g., autonomy 
of the individual, protection of civil and politi- 
cal liberties, establishment of a government 
based on law with the consent of the governed, 
and protection from arbitrary authority), then 
ethnic transformation would evolve into liberal 
democracy. 
The model, as presented up to this point, 
remains too abstract and theoretical. This due 
to the fact that in addition to the direction and 
mode of transformation, the 'starting position' 
in the process of ethnic transformation needs 
to be outlined. This requires a description of 
the ethnic stratification patterns in the national 
republics in the early 1980s. It is because the 
ethnic stratification of the pre-Gorbachev 
USSR, to a large degree, determined the char- 
acter of ethnic tensions and grievances, as well 
as the possibilities and constraints for change 
(e.g., access to resources, differences in socio- 
economic status among members of ethnic 
groups, differences in their group and territo- 
rial distribution, differences in culture, etc.). 
Therefore, before applying the outlined model 
to an analysis of ethnic transformation, the pat- 
terns of ethnic stratification that emerged in the 
national republics of the USSR by the early 
1980s wdl be briefly described. 
Patterns of Ethnic Stratification in  
the Late Soviet Period 
For analytical purposes four types of ethnic 
stratification can be discerned in the national 
republics of the former USSR (Figure 2). Eth- 
nic stratification in Ukraine can be described 
as having had a fluid-competitive character. 
During the last three centuries the territories 
of what are now contemporary Ukraine were 
incorporated piecemeal into the Czarist Empire, 
and later into the USSR. The integration of 
the Ukrainians into the Russian nation was 
greatly facilitated by the linguistic and cultural 
similarity of the two ethnic groups (Kiev was 
the cradle of the Russian Orthodoxy). Further- 
more, on an indvidual level, there was no dis- 
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Figure 2. Patterns of ethnic stratijcation in the national replrblics of the USSR* 
Based on: Shibilrfani and Kawn (1965). Van den Berge (1978) and Wilson (1978), Horowifz (1985) 
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crimination against ethnic Slavs in the USSR. 
Ukrainians (as well as Byelorussians) were able 
to secure high-placed positions in the military, 
state and/or party bureaucracy. As a result of 
the long historical process, ethnic boundaries 
between Ukrainians and Russians became fluid. 
Modernization and economic development 
since WWII only accelerated the process of 
Ukrainian assimilation into the Russian nation. 
In Ukraine, Russians and Ukrainians shared 
control of all major institutions, and the rates 
of intermarriage were high (Motyl 1993). 
On the opposite end of the scale from 
Ukraine was Central Asia, which was charac- 
terized by a rigid-competitive type of ethnic 
stratification. When Czarist Russia invaded the 
region in the late 19th century, it was at a semi- 
feudal level of development. The creation of 
the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Turkmen 
nations was largely the consequence of efforts 
by Soviet administrators, bureaucrats, planners, 
engineers, and the military to impose workable 
territorial boundaries on the huge, newly ac- 
quired territory (Lieven and McGarry 1993). 
The policies of modernization in Central 
Asia, pursued by Moscow during and after 
WWII, had encouraged mass migration of e th- 
nic Russians into the region. At the same time 
development and modernization of the region 
had also significantly contributed to the ad- 
vancement of the titular populations. A size- 
R 
able class of professionals, state and party bu- 
reaucrats had developed in Central Asia. By 
the early 1970s the advancement of the titular 
populations resulted in an increase in ethnic 
competition between them and Russians for 
jobs, education and housing (Fierman 1991). 
However, despite the rise of the eponymous 
professional class, and increase in ethnic com- 
petition, ethnic Russians continued to run most 
of the industries, transportation, education and 
medical systems in Central Asia. The Kremlin 
kept Russians in these dominant positions in or- 
der to maintain control over the region. Rus- 
sians also dominated the region because the 
modernization policies carried out by Moscow 
allowed only limited participation of the local 
populations. Moscow treated this region as an 
appendix to the Soviet economy, utilizing its rich 
resources for the Center's needs rather than for 
development of the region. Thus, Soviet mod- 
ernization failed to develop sizable indigenous 
working classes. As a result of these develop- 
ments, rigid-competitive ethnic stratification 
emerged in Central Asia. 
Military incorporation of the economically 
and socially advanced Baltic states produced a 
third, bipolar, pattern of ethnic stratification. 
Before the Soviet invasion in 1940, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania were independent coun- 
tries possessing all the institutions of modern 
states. They had well developed cultures, and 
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strong ethnic identities, and their standards of 
living were higher than in Russia. 
Post-WWII development in the region led 
to the rapid evolution of institutional complete- 
ness of the Baltic Soviet republics. Thus, the 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian administra- 
tion, media, educational systems, and cultural 
institutions were created. Full-fledged socio- 
economic stratification of the titular populations 
emerged, which included both the working and 
middle classes (intelligentsia, managerial strata, 
state and party bureaucrats). 
At the same time, continuous industrial de- 
velopment, combined with the high living stan- 
dards in the region, led to mass migration of 
ethnic Russians into the Baltics. Thus, in five 
decades since the end of WWII, the proportion 
of Russians in Latvia had increased from 10% 
to 34%, and in Estonia, from 8% to 30% (Har- 
ris 1993). The mass migration of ethnic Rus- 
sians to the region, in which titular populations 
already had developed institutions, led to the 
formation of bipolar ethnic stratification in the 
Baltics. Each ethnic group, eponymous and 
Russian, had their own relatively separate in- 
stitutions, patterns of recruitment and social 
mobility, and relatively little contact across the 
ethnic divide. 
The emergence of two societies within the 
single administrative frameworks of the national 
republics heightened ethnic tensions in the re- 
gion. In part this occurred because the continu- 
ous immigration of ethnic Russians threatened 
to undermine the demographic balance in the 
Baltics, and convert Latvians and Estonians into 
ethnic minorities in their own republics. 
Ethnic stratification in Moldova exhib- 
its features of both rigid-competitive and bipo- 
lar stratification. Such stratification developed, 
in part, because Moldova was created by Stalin 
in 1940 from the territories of two different 
states. Transnistria (Pridniestriovie in 
Russophones.), located on the left bank of the 
Dniester river, was part of Ukraine. Bessarabia, 
the territory on the right bank of the Dniester 
river, was part of Romania prior to WWII. His- 
torically, Transnistria had a large Slavic (Rus- 
sian and Ukrainian) population. Bessarabia was 
populated mainly by Romanian peasants. Since 
the moment of Moldavia's creation, the Slavic 
population of Transnistria dominated the repub- 
lic. Transnistria controlled the republic, in part, 
because it was economically more developed 
than rural Bessarabia. 
After the end of WWII, the policies of eco- 
nomic and social development pursued by Mos- 
cow initiated rapid social differentiation within 
the titular population and led to consolidation 
of the ethnic Moldovan middle classes. Never- 
theless, these positive developments failed to 
bridge the deep ethnic, social, and economic di- 
visions that existed between the two segments 
of the Moldovan republic. First of all, economic 
development was spread very unevenly through- 
out the territory of the republic. Industries were 
built mostly in SlavicTransnistria, while the right 
bank of the Dniester remained predominantly 
rural. Therefore, despite its smaller size, Slavic 
Transnistria dominated the Moldovan republic. 
Unlike in the Baltics, the adoption of the Rus- 
sian language remained a precondition for so- 
cial mobility in Moldova (Crowther 1997; Fane 
1993; Kolsto 1993). 
In sum, the intersection of deep regional and 
ethnic divisions in Moldova produced a mixed 
type of ethnic stratification. The bipolarity of 
the ethnic structure emerged as two ethnic so- 
cieties were consolidating in two separate re- 
gions of the country. The interaction between 
the two ethnic 'pillars' of Moldovan society had 
clearly expressed features of Slavic domination 
and Moldovan subordination. 
The analysis carried out in this section indi- 
cates that, by the early 1980s, ethnic stratifica- 
tion in the periphery of the USSR was charac- 
terized by two major features. First, the poli- 
cies of modernization and development pursued 
by Moscow since the end of WWII, and the con- 
solidation of the eponymous middle classes, 
were eroding the superior position that ethnic 
Russians had enjoyed in the national republics. 
Second, the character of Russian domination 
varied significantly across the periphery of the 
USSR. The dominant position of Russians was 
most clearly expressed in Central Asia and 
Moldova. Russian domination was more am- 
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bivalent in the Baltic republics. The majority 
of ethnic Russians had moved to the region be- 
cause of the higher standards of living in the 
Baltics than in other parts of the USSR, includ- 
ing Russia itself. Therefore, Russian attitudes 
toward Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians 
were a mixture of superiority and inferiority 
(Lieven 1993). In Ukraine development and 
urbanization only accelerated the process of 
Ukrainian assimilation into the Russian nation. 
Although the position of ethnic Russians by 
the early 1980s had partially eroded, this did not 
constitute a threat to their security, or political 
and cultural rights. Moscow's unchallenged 
control over the national republics and ruthless 
suppression of any signs of nationalism provided 
the local Russians with assurance of their secu- 
rity and protection. This situation changed dra- 
matically once the power of the Center started 
to decline. As Moscow was losing control over 
the national republics, the local conditions be- 
gan to increasingly determine the situation of 
ethnic Russians. It was at that time that the 
features of ethnic stratification described here 
began to play a crucial role in the process of 
ethnic transformation. 
Ethnic Tkansformation in the 
Successor States of the USSR 
The policies of liberalization pursued by 
Gorbachev during the late 1980s allowed for the 
consolidation of political opposition to the com- 
munist regime in the periphery of the Empire. 
However, the emerging nationalism in the pe- 
riphery of the country had not yet consolidated 
into a political force strong enough to displace 
the Center. At the same time, the Center weak- 
ened by Gorbachev's reforms could not unilat- 
erally impose its will on non-Russian regions ei- 
ther. Thus, an impasse ensued in which the old 
principles of stratification promoting Russian 
dominance within the Soviet state were openly 
challenged, while new principles of stratifica- 
tion had not yet been established. As a result, 
Moscow, the nationalizing republics, and the 
local Russian populations engaged in negotia- 
tions over the future of ethnic order in the coun- 
try. 
The interaction of structural characteristics 
with the strategies pursued by the ethnic Rus- 
sian minorities, the nationalizing successor 
states, and the Russian Federation produced 
four trajectories of ethnic transformation (Fig- 
ure 3). The following sections briefly analyze 
each of them. 
The Baltics: Ethnic Transformation through 
Attempts to Impose Ethnic Dominance and 
Carry out Reforms. 
The process of ethnic transformation in the 
Baltics was characterized by a perpetual vacil- 
lation between civic and ethnic strands of Bal- 
tic nationalism (Figure 3). This characteristic 
of ethnic transformation can be partly explained 
by the bipolar ethnic stratification of the region. 
Developments in the Baltics preceding 
perestroika had led to the consolidation of the 
two incipient ethnic societies which had been 
poised for a 'showdown' as soon as the Center 
started to decline. 
Because the Russian communities in Latvia 
and Estonia were much larger than in Lithuania, 
Estonia and Latvia went through much wider 
'ethnic hegemony-civic nationalism' swings 
than Lithuania. By far, such swings proved most 
destabilizing in Estonia because of the great ter- 
ritorial concentration of ethnic Russians in the 
northeastern part of that republic. The quest 
for ethnic hegemony in Estonia, therefore, of- 
ten led to the counter demands of ethnic Rus- 
sians for autonomy and even secession of the 
northeastern territories. 
The liberalization of the Soviet political sys- 
tem (1987-1989) initiated by Gorbachev led to 
the rapid rise of ethnic nationalism in the re- 
gion. Attempts to subordinate the Russian seg- 
ments of the population need to be understood, 
first and foremost, as a defensive reaction of 
the small Baltic nations to the policies of 
Russification and demographic imperialism 
which had threatened their ethnic survival. The 
rapid grass roots mobilization was also fostered 
by the strong ethnic identities of the Baltic 
people, their cultural traditions and historic 
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Figure 3. Direction and mode of ethnic transfornlation in the states of the fonner USSR, 1985-1998 
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grievances which included lost statehood, and 
mass terror following the end of WWII 
(Misiunas and Taagapera 1993; Sedaitis and 
Butterfield 1991; Taagepera 1993). 
While the Center was strong enough to 
maintain control over the republics, the titular 
societies attempted to subordinate the Russian 
segment of the population within the framework 
of the Soviet state. This occurred through at- 
tempts to promote the eponymous 'cadres' 
within the centralized and hierarchical institu- 
tions of the Soviet state by pushing out the 'cad- 
res' of Russian ethnicity from positions of power 
and prestige. Predictably, the result was a rapid 
escalation of ethnic tensions in the region. Eth- 
nic tensions reached a peak in 1989 when the 
newly elected Soviets declared restoration of the 
Baltic republics' independence. The declara- 
tions of independence were followed by a wave 
of protest demonstrations and mass political 
strikes by ethnic Russians (Apine 1993; Tishkov 
1994). 
By late 1989 ethic tensions in the region be- 
gan to decline due in part to the transforma- 
tion of Baltic nationalism. Instead of espous- 
ing a struggle for 'ethnic hegemony,' Baltic na- 
tionalism evolved into a mass movement for the 
restoration of the independent Estonian, 
Latvian and Lithuanian states. Struggle for in- 
dependence motivated Baltic national leaders 
to actively search for an accommodation with 
the large Russian population in the region. Fac- 
ing Moscow's threat to use military force, the 
Baltics could ill-afford a restless and resentful 
Russian population. Additionally, the ensuing 
political and economic chaos in the Russian 
Federation and the limited possibilities to re- 
turn to their homeland significantly weakened 
the Russians' opposition to Baltic indepen- 
dence. The result was a decline in ethnic ten- 
sions throughout the region. 
By the time independence was restored in 
1991, the ethnic situation in Lithuania had nor- 
malized (Gaidys 1994). Due to its small size 
the Russian community in Lithuania did not 
represent a threat to Lithuanian ethnic domi- 
nance. Every resident of the republic who ap- 
plied for the new Lithuanian passport was au- 
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tomatically granted citizenship. In addition, ex- 
tensive cultural rights were extended to ethnic 
Russians in the republic (Lakis 1995). 
In Estonia and Latvia the situation was very 
different. Independence led to the rapid rise of 
ethnic nationalism in these two states. This oc- 
curred for a variety of reasons. First, the 
unexcepted collapse of the Center after the 
failed August 1991 coup d'e'tat dramatically 
changed the power balance between the ethnic 
communities in the republics. Once the impe- 
rial Center collapsed, national governments no 
longer needed local Russians as allies in their 
struggle for independence. Second, ethnic na- 
tionalism in Latvia and Estonia was fueled by 
widespread fears and doubts about the commit- 
ment of the Russian population to the cause of 
independence. Because ethnic Russians con- 
stituted a significant part of the population, they 
could control the power balance in the repub- 
lics through democratic means. Third, ethnic 
nationalism was also fueled by the presence of 
the Soviet Army in the region. Any protest ac- 
tion of local Russians, especially if it was sup- 
ported by the Soviet Army, could easily desta- 
bilize the situation in the republics. Finally, 
nationalist parties used ethnic nationalism in 
hopes that this would encourage ethnic Russians 
to leave these republics for Russia, as well as a 
strategy to compete for electoral votes. 
The imposition of ethnic dominance by the 
titular nationalities proceeded through attempts 
to institutionalize an 'ethnic democratic' system 
in Latvia and Estonia. Citizenship laws were 
enacted that excluded ethnic Russians from par- 
ticipation in national  politic^.^ As a result, no 
ethnic Russians were elected to the Estonian 
parliament in 1993 despite the fact that ethnic 
Russians constituted a third of the republic's 
population. In Latvia, only 7 ethnic Russians 
were elected (out of a 100 member parliament) 
when the Russian population constituted close 
to half of the republic's population (Smith et 
al., 1994). 
As a reaction to disenfranchisement, small 
but vocal organizations of ethnic Russians in 
Latvia began to emerge with the intention of 
protecting the rights of ethnic Russians in this 
republic (Terechov 1993). In Estonia reaction 
to disenfranchisement was much stronger. In 
the northeastern part of Estonia attempts to 
restrict rights to citizenship were met with anti- 
government demonstrations. In 1993 a refer- 
endum on the question of political autonomy 
in this region of Estonia was organized (RFEI 
RL Daily Report, July 23, 1993). 
As ethnic tensions in the region were in- 
creasing, the Russian Federation, as well as in- 
ternational organizations such as the Confer- 
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
the Council of Europe, and the Helsinki Watch 
on Human Rights, began to put pressure on the 
Estonian and Latvian governments to modify 
their citizenship legislation. Under the impact 
of the protests of local Russians, international 
pressure, and pressure from the Russian Fed- 
eration, citizenship laws in Latvia and Estonia 
were significantly modified. Both countries 
began to gradually move towards majoritarian 
democracy .This  significantly improved the 
ethnic situation in the region (Raskazov 1995; 
Grishaev 1995). 
Despite recent positive political develop- 
ments, the dismantling of the 'ethnic democra- 
cies' in Latvia and Estonia remains a conflict 
ridden and contradictory process (Kahar 1997; 
Pettai 1997; Rikken 1997). Ethnic tensions will 
most likely continue to vacillate in the near fu- 
ture, although probably not at the amplitude at 
which it occurred during the last decade. It is 
likely that both the policies of gradual enfran- 
chisement currently being pursued by Estonia 
and Latvia and the ethnic Russians' competi- 
tiveness and willingness to integrate into the 
eponymous communities will lead to increas- 
ing social divisions within the ethnic Russian 
community. No doubt there will be continuous 
growth in the size of the ethnic Russian upper 
and middle classes, which will lead to their in- 
creasing integration into the eponymous soci- 
eties. 
At the same time, a sizable Russian ethnic 
underclass will develop consisting of those who 
could not manage to successfully adapt to the 
radical ethno-political and economic changes in 
the republics, and/or those who were excluded 
Socialines tapatybes klausimai 
by cultural and language barriers. The  
underclass will consist of Russian blue-color 
workers with low skills and limited education 
who only recently migrated to the Baltics and 
were stranded there by the collapse of the 
USSR. The ethnic divisions within the Baltic 
societies will perpetuate the conditions neces- 
sary for the formation of an ethnic Russian 
underclass. It is the disproportionate concen- 
tration of ethnic Russians in the underclass that 
will continue to be the cause of social and eth- 
nic tensions in the Baltic states. 
Moldova: Ethnic Transformation From 
Attempts to Displace non-Titular Elites to 
I Ethno- Territorial Federation. The developments in Moldova were char- 
acterized by attempts to radically transform its 
ethnic structure by displacing ethnic Slavs (Rus- 
sians and Ukrainians) from positions of privi- 
lege and power and also by the imposition of an 
ethnic hegemony by the titular nationality in the 
republics (Figure 3). This happened in part 
because Moldova is made up of a coalescence 
of territories from two formerly different states: 
an annexed part of Romanian territory and 
Ukrainian territory historically settled by Slavs. 
Moscow's socioeconomic did not succeed in 
closing deep historical, linguistic, and cultural 
gap between the Moldovan population and eth- 
nic Slavs. Once the process of liberalization of 
the country began, the deeply ethnically divided 
Moldovan state began to quickly unravel. The 
Bessarabian part pushed for Moldova's unifi- 
cation with Romania, while Slavic Transnistria 
pressed for unification with the Russian state 
(Fane 1993; King 1994). 
The effort to unify Moldova and Romania 
was met with strong opposition by ethnic Rus- 
sians and members of other non-titular ethnic 
groups living in the republic. First of all, ethnic 
Russians argued that the Dniester region popu- 
lated by Slavs had never belonged to either Ro- 
mania or Moldova. Second, the reunification 
of Moldova with Romania threatened to radi- 
cally change the ethno-demographic balance in 
the republic. As a result of unification, ethnic 
Slavs would become a numerically insignificant 
minority with almost no political and economic 
influence in the state of Romania. Third, eco- 
nomically, Romania was even more underde- 
veloped and had a lower standard of living than 
Moldova. In addition, Romania during late 
1980s was extremely politically unstable. The 
anti-government violence that spread through- 
out Romania's cities, and which resulted in the 
overthrow of the ~ e a u ~ e c u  regime in 1989, had 
put the country on the brink of civil war. Fi- 
nally, the Romanian state's very poor treatment 
of ethnic minorities, especially ethnic Hungar- 
ians and Gypsies, made the unification of 
Moldova and Romania simply unacceptable to 
the Russians (Ganelin 1990; Romanova 1992). 
Therefore, attempts by the Moldovan na- 
tionalists to embark on a course toward reuni- 
fication with Romania led to a rapid escalation 
of an ethnopolitical conflict, which by 1991 
erupted into open military warfare. The blood- 
shed was stopped only when the Soviet Army 
intervened in the conflict on behalf of the 
Dniester regiom6 The result was a de facto par- 
titioning of the Moldovan state along ethnic 
lines into an independent 'Dniester Soviet So- 
cialist Republics' and Moldova proper. In this 
ethnic conflict, nearly 600 people were killed 
and about 100,000 of the population became 
refugees (Helsinki Human Rights Watch 1993). 
The intervention of Soviet troops and the 
resulting partitioning of Moldova produced a 
stalemate in the struggle between the two parts 
of Moldova. Due to the stalemate, Chisinau 
had abandoned its course toward unification 
with Romania. Instead of attempting to con- 
vert Russians into an ethnic minority within the 
Romanian state, intensive elite negotiations 
began over the political autonomy of the ethnic 
enclave. 
What motivated the Moldovan side to instiga- 
te such negotiations? First, Moldova came out 
of the conflict in Transnistria as a loser and faced 
the catastrophic consequences of the drive to- 
ward unification: partitioned territory, a bitterly 
divided society, a ruined economy, hundreds of 
people killed, and thousands of refugees. 
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Second, the negotiations were initiated be- 
cause of the change in leadership of the 
Moldovan state. The devastating failure of the 
drive toward unification produced a split in the 
ruling elites of the republic. When former Com- 
munists and bureaucrats from the powerful ag- 
ricultural establishment in Moldova came into 
power in 1992, they were, by far, more willing 
than Moldovan nationalists to share power with 
the Russian community in the country. Unlike 
Moldovan intellectuals, agrarians and former 
communists weren't enthralled with the idea of 
Moldova's unification with Romania. For the 
them unification would mean the loss of con- 
trol over the country and subordination to the 
functionaries in Romania. Finally, the pro- 
tracted ethnic war had led to the decline of 
popular mass mobilization in the republic. As 
the economy in the country collapsed, the popu- 
lace became increasingly preoccupied with day- 
to-day survival and were exhausted and weary 
of the violence and uncertainty. 
In order to consolidate the independent 
Moldovan state and to preserve its territorial 
integrity, the new government was exceedingly 
accommodating to its ethnic minorities' de- 
mands. This was accomplished by including 
members of the ethnic minorities in a 'national 
consensus' government. Furthermore, the new 
government also began negotiations with eth- 
nic minorities over the creation of national-ter- 
ritorial units within the Moldovan state7. 
However, until very recently, Dniester lead- 
ers have rejected Chisinau's proposal to create 
an autonomous territorial unit in the region. 
They demanded either separate statehood, a 
confederation of their self-proclaimed republic 
with Moldova proper, or a unification with the 
Russian Federation. A major break in the pro- 
tracted conflict within Moldova came in June 
1997 when leaders of the breakaway region 
agreed to begin negotiations with Chisinau. The 
deciding factors which pushed the breakaway 
region to negotiate were the economic bank- 
ruptcy of the  unreformed Transnistria's 
economy and its isolation within the interna- 
tional community (Globe (1997) and RFEIRL 
Daily Newsline, 9 May, 21 and 25 July, 1997). 
However, in the current situation it is not 
Chisinau, but Moscow that dictates the condi- 
tions of the conflict settlement in Moldovas. 
The Kremlin seems to be interested in preserv- 
ing the current situation in which it plays the 
role of mediator between two sides of the di- 
.vided country. Its position as intermediary al- 
lows Moscow to retain its military presence in 
the region. Moscow also delays solving the 
Transnistria problem because the conflict in the 
region remains a 'hot button' issue in Russia's 
domestic politics. Any attempts by Moscow to 
officially disengage from the region will be in- 
terpreted by nationalist and Communist oppo- 
sition as a sellout of Russia's land and interests, 
and an abandonment of the brethren in the face 
of ethnic oppression. 
Conversely, Moscow's overwhelming mili- 
tary presence in Moldova is not conducive to 
stabilization of the country either. Moscow's 
active interference in Moldova's internal affairs 
can unravel Moldova's ruling coalition and lead 
to a consolidation of Moldova's nationalist op- 
position. Because of the volatility of the situa- 
tion, it is difficult to talk about future ethnic 
developments in the country. The best case sce- 
nario would be stabilization of the situation in 
the form of an ethno-territorial constitution of 
the Moldovan state. Three conditions appear 
essential for such a development: (a) economic 
improvement in the country, (b) the withdrawal 
of Russian military forces from the country, and 
(c) the development of a close bilateral rela- 
tionship between Moldova and Russia, similar 
to the type of relationships being developed 
between Kazakhstan and Russia, and 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Without Moldova's 
close association with Russia, Dniester will not 
agree to relinquish its powers to Chisinau. 
Central Asia: Elite-Negotiated Ethnic 
Transformation. 
The third type of ethnic transformation, 
elite-negotiated, is characteristic of the Central 
Asian republics. Unlike the Baltics, Moldova, 
or Ukraine, in Central Asia (with an exception 
of Uzbekistany) Despite its initial success, the 
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Birlik's influence by the early 1990s had declined 
rapidly. Its fate closely resembled the fate of 
other oppositional groups that were created dur- 
ing the years of perestroika in Central Asia. 
Similar to the other Central Asian republics, 
there was a consolidation of Karimov's authori- 
tarian presidential regime in Uzbekistan that 
severely limited political freedoms, and harassed 
or  eliminated its political opponents. Personal 
differences among the Birlik leadership led to a 
split within and weakening of the organization. 
There was also a decline in public support for 
liberal-democratic reforms in the republic be- 
cause of the rapid decline of the economy, the 
spread of massive communal violence through 
the region, and the rise of a militant Islamic op- 
position in neighboring Tajikistan.) there were 
no mass-based nationalist, anti-colonial or anti- 
Russian movements. Therefore, ethnic trans- 
formation proceeded within the framework of 
unreformed Soviet institutions. 
The weakness of nationalist opposition to 
the Communist regime in Central Asia can, to 
a large degree, be explained by the character of 
the social stratification of the titular societies. 
Although the process of modernization had pro- 
duced eponymous educated classes and politi- 
cal elites, the lives of the rest of the population 
in the region were little changed by Moscow's 
policies of development. The majority of Cen- 
tral Asia's population remained rural, with the 
relatively unchanged ways of life of a traditional 
peasant society. The eponymous working class 
was small (Fierman 1991). 
The titular elites, 'sandwiched' between the 
imperial Center and the primarily rural popu- 
lation of the region, had little economic or  po- 
litical interest in promoting separatism or  na- 
tionalism. This was due to the fact that their 
existence was highly dependent on the function- 
ing of the centralized imperial bureaucracies. 
In addition, the local elites were interested in 
remaining part of the USSR because of the 
deepening economic, ecological and demo- 
graphic crises in the region. Therefore, instead 
of promoting nationalism and separatism, the 
eponymous elites chose, simultaneously, to re- 
press o r  tightly control activities of the emerg- 
ing political opposition, and to lobby Moscow 
for  increasing investment in the  region 
(Zaslavsky 1992). 
The weakness of mass-based nationalism 
and separatism in this region can also be par- 
tially accounted for by the absence of wide- 
spread anti-Russian sentiment. Ethnicity was a 
rather new phenomenon in the region, brought 
in and constructed predominately by the Sovi- 
ets. Therefore Moscow's rule was perceived 
much more favorably in this region than in the 
European part of the USSR (Dannreuther 
1994). Finally, the Russian population in the 
region did not represent a demographic threat 
to the titular populations because the size of 
the Russian communities had been declining 
since the early 1970s (Tishkov 1995). 
Because of the relatively weak nationalist 
sentiment and tight control over political activi- 
ties, the major factor affecting the situation of 
local ethnic Russians was not the policies of the 
eponymous elites, but the change in Moscow's 
policies in the region. Since the late 1980s the 
Kremlin was increasingly disengaging from the 
region. With an ailing Soviet economy there 
were simply no economic resources available to 
continue to rule a vastly overstretched Empire. 
In addition, public pressure was rising in Rus- 
sia itself for dissociation from a poor and un- 
derdeveloped Central Asia. The majority of 
Russia's population perceived Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and 
Tajikistan as corrupt, inefficient, and ruled by 
criminal mafias. 
Since independence there was a consolida- 
tion of autocratic regimes in Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Few attempts were 
made to carry out political or  economic reforms 
in these republics. Instead, the sudden and quite 
unexpected withdrawal of the former colonial 
rulers undermined the economic and political 
base of local Russians and initiated a bitter 
struggle for power among different regional and 
clan factions within the state and party appara- 
tus. Disintegration of the colonial economic and 
political infrastructure and intra-fighting among 
eponymous elites initiated mass Russian migra- 
tion from the region. By 1994, about 1 million 
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ethnic Russians had left Central Asia, includ- 
ing almost 500,000 from Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (Makarova 
1995). 
Mass emigration had disastrous effects on 
the Russian Federation, as well as on the 
economy of Central Asia. Russia had neither 
the political will, nor the ability to accept such a 
significant number of repatriates (Nahaylo 1994; 
Shumarin 1995). Local economies and social 
services in Central Asia were also badly hurt as 
skilled Russian personnel, such as doctors, 
teachers, and engineers, were leaving the region 
in large numbers (Pulatov 1990; Tishkov 1995). 
In attempts to curb migration, negotiations 
over the future status of ethnic Russians in these 
three states began. Governments of Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, prodded by 
Moscow's active lobbying, were promising ex- 
tensive state patronage to local Russians so as 
to stabilize their pop~lat ion '~.  Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan and, to a lesser degree, Uzbekistan 
provided extensive cultural, and political rights 
to ethnic Russians (Chinn and Kaiser, 1996, pp. 
211-238). Turkmenistan and Tajikistan even 
made bilateral agreements with Russia that pro- 
vide dual citizenship to local Russians (Terechov 
1993; RFEIRL Daily Report, July 19,1994; OMRZ 
Daily Digest, July 11, 1995). 
An extensive (in comparison with the other 
ethnic minorities in these countries) state pa- 
tronage was provided, in part, because the Rus- 
sian populations in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan were relatively small and, therefore, 
did not constitute a challenge to the dominant 
eponymous elites. At the same time, the role 
of ethnic Russians in the economies of these 
countries remains very high. In addition, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan re- 
main vulnerable to Moscow's military, economic 
and political pressure. 
The high degree of legal accommodation to 
the demands of ethnic Russians in Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan seems paradoxi- 
cal, especially taking into account the present 
characterization of the regimes in these former 
Soviet republics as ethnocratic. However, this 
paradox dissolves if one takes into aCcount the 
clan-based social structure of Central Asian so- 
cieties. Power in Central Asia functions, not so 
much through law, but through regional and/or 
kinship networks of patronage, personal loyalty, 
and nepotism. It is not the state, but the net- 
works of kinship and patronage, that provide 
-security, support, and protection for their mem- 
bers (Rashidov 1992). Consequently, whatever 
laws and rights are accorded to ethnic Russians, 
they, as inordosty (Russophones. for foreigners), 
are excluded from power, their position in the 
republics is insecure, and their social mobility 
is blocked. 
Unless there is significant improvement in 
the economic situation, ethnic Russians will con- 
tinue to leave Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Because of the raging civil war be- 
tween former Communists and the Islamic op- 
position, almost all ethnic Russians have already 
left Tajikistan. The situation of ethnic Russians 
is more favorable in the politically stable, but 
least reformed, Turkmenistan, which is endowed 
with enormous gas and oil resources. For now, 
the neo-Stalinist rule of Turkmen president 
Niyazov is able to assure the protection and se- 
curity of the ethnic Russians, while the gas and 
oil riches of the country hold promise in con- 
verting Turkmenistan into a second Kuwait. 
Uzbekistan, similar to Turkmenistan, is po- 
litically stable. At the same time, ethnic Rus- 
sians in Uzbekistan are subjected to pressures 
of nativization. One reason why this is happen- 
ing is because Uzbekistan, as the most popu- 
lous nation in Central Asia tries to project it- 
self as the leader of the region (Starr 1996). The 
'uzbekinization' of the society, along with vul- 
nerability to informal harassment, and lack of 
prospects for economic and social mobility are 
pushing ethnic Russians to migrate back to the 
Russian Federation (Ivanov 1994; Dunlop 
1994). Arguably, the stabilization of the ethnic 
Russian population will most likely occur only 
when most of the best educated, younger, and 
higher-skilled ethnic Russians have left the state. 
The process of pauperization will push the Rus- 
sian population to the fringes of Uzbek society. 
In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan there was for- 
mation of the regimes that represent a mixture 
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of ethnocratic and consociational features. Both 
republics are ruled by autocratic regimes led by 
moderate reformers Nursultan Nazarbayev of 
Kazakhstan and Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan. 
Although Kyrgyz and Kazakhs are the dominant 
ethnic groups within Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan, the leadership of these two coun- 
tries agreed to share the power with ethnic Rus- 
sians. Thus, ethnic Russians are accorded lim- 
ited participation in the government and state 
bureaucracies, enjoy cultural autonomy and 
equal citizenship and voting rights," while the 
state and its institutions remain under the con- 
trol of the "clans" led by Nazarbayev and 
Akayev12. 
Four major factors explain implementation 
of the consociational arrangements in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. First, the size of 
the Russian population in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan was much larger than in 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Be- 
cause of the significant size, Russian communi- 
ties could not be easily pushed to the fringes of 
Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz societies, especially be- 
cause of their crucial role in the economies of 
both countries. Second, the degree of ethnic 
Kazakhs' and Kyrgyz's Russification was much 
higher than in the other three Central Asian re- 
publics. In addition, nationality policies in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were directed to- 
wards the creation of territorially-based 
Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz nations (Nazarbaev 
1995). Finally, the Kazakh and Kyrgyz regimes 
agreed to share control of their states with eth- 
nic Russians because of Moscow's political pres- 
sure and Kazakhstan's and Kyrgyzstan's eco- 
nomic and political dependence on the Russian 
Federation. 
The consociational policies pursued by 
Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani regimes were 
rather successful in stabilizing the ethnic situa- 
tion in these two new countries. This was espe- 
cially the case in Kazakhstan (Gudkov 1995). 
However, the consociational features of the 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan remain very un- 
stable. First, because the access to the positions 
of privilege and power by ethnic Russians de- 
pends on the personal authority of the current 
Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani leaders. If some- 
thing were to happen to Nazarbayev or Akayev, 
the power sharing arrangements between titu- 
lar ethnic groups and Russians can be renegoti- 
ated again. Second, consociational features will 
most likely decline unless there is improvement 
in the economic situation. This is especially true 
in the case of Kyrgyzstan. Because of the pov- 
erty and continuous decline of the Kyrgyz 
economy, Russian repatriation to the Russian 
Federation had significantly diminished the size 
and socioeconomic status of the Russian com- 
munity in this country. The declining size of 
the Russian community, combined with a high 
degree of inter-clan rivalry and conflict in 
Kyrgyzstan, will most likely lead to a consolida- 
tion of the ethnocratic regime similar to that in 
Uzbekistan. 
Unless Russia actively promotes secession- 
ism in northern Kazakhstan, the process of eth- 
nic transformation in the country will most likely 
fluctuate between ethnocratic and 
consociationalist features, without a decisive 
prevalence of one or the other. If there are 
changes in the current top leadership of 
Kazakhstani, or if Kazakhstan lapses into a deep 
and protracted economic crisis, the ethnic 
assertiveness of Kazakhs and Russian separat- 
ism will most likely increase. Conversely, eco- 
nomic improvement, combined with the Rus- 
sian Federation's demands for protection of eth- 
nic Russian minorities, and a high degree of po- 
litical and economic dependence on Russia, will 
constrain the development of an ethnocratic re- 
gime in Kazakhstan. 
Ukraine: Ethnic Transformation through 
Reform and Abolition of Ethnic Hierarchy. 
The fourth and final type of ethnic trans- 
formation was characteristic to the develop- 
ments in Ukraine. In Ukraine the emerging op- 
position to colonial Moscow's rule and, later, 
formation of the administration of the indepen- 
dent Ukraine were based on a delicate coali- 
tions between Ukrainian speaking nationalists 
from the Western part of the country and eth- 
nic Russians from the Eastern Ukraine. Will- 
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ingness of Ukrainian nationalists to share power 
with ethnic Russians can in part be explained 
by high degree of the assimilation of Ukraini- 
ans. Because of assimilation, the Russian- 
Ukrainian ethnic divide (defined by common 
ancestry) did not coincide with Russian-Ukrai- 
nian linguistic and cultural divisions. Therefore 
attempts of the Ukrainian nationalists to assert 
Ukrainian ethnic hegemony would likely gen- 
erate resentment, protest and backlash, not only 
among ethnic Russians, but also among 
Russified Ukrainians. The result was the de- 
velopment of the consociationalism in Ukraine, 
when ethnic Russians and  Ukrainians,  
Russophones and Ukrainophones share equally 
the power over the state13. 
However, as illustrated in Figure 3, ethnic 
transformation in Ukraine did not proceed with- 
out creation of ethnic tensions between ethnic 
Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. Mild attempts 
to Ukrainize the population in the republic were 
usually followed by periods of decreased inter- 
ethnic tension. This vacillation of inter-ethnic 
tensions can be explained by the deep regional 
divisions in Ukraine. In other words, ethnic dis- 
cord in this country is expressed in the form of 
regional tensions and conflict. Two regional 
'fault lines' emerged in Ukraine: (a) one be- 
tween the nationalistic, anti-Moscow and anti- 
communist Western Ukraine and the more 
Russified and conservative Eastern Ukraine; 
and (b) one between the ethnic Russian enclave 
in the Crimean peninsulaI4 and Ukraine proper. 
Because of deep regional divisions, the east- 
ern and western parts of Ukraine responded dif- 
ferently to the policies of liberalization initiated 
by Gorbachev. In western Ukraine, similar to 
the Baltics, there was a consolidation of the na- 
tional-democratic opposition to the Communist 
regime. It sought to promote democratization 
in the republic and assure the protection and 
development of the Ukrainian language and cul- 
ture. In the highly Russified eastern Ukraine, 
mobilization proceeded not along ethnic, but 
along class lines. In eastern Ukraine, the 
Donbas region miners organized the first inde- 
pendent labor union in the Soviet Union. The 
miners agenda was limited strictly to economic 
issues. Although both groups were in opposi- 
tion to the Communist party, there was little 
cooperation between them (Marples 1991). 
In early 1990, regionally fragmented oppo- 
sition in Ukraine began to consolidate under 
the leadership of the National-Communist fac- 
tion within the Ukrainian Communist Party. 
The policies pursued by the National-commu- 
nist' leadership in asserting Ukraine's sover- 
eignty from Moscow were able to moderate na- 
tionalists' demands. Communist leadership was 
also successful in assuring the support of the 
miners by promising economic prosperity to the 
entire population in an independent Ukraine. 
The result was the creation of wide political 
opposition to Moscow's colonial rule, leading 
Ukraine to independencelj. 
However, the dramatic deterioration of the 
economic situation during the first years of in- 
dependence had negatively affected the ethnic 
situation in Ukraine. Most ethnic Russians sup- 
ported Ukraine's independence for economic 
reasons, in hopes that Ukraine would quickly 
achieve economic prosperity. The collapse of 
Ukraine's economy following independence and 
rapidly spreading poverty led to the rise of pro- 
Russian sentiments in the Russified regions of 
the country. In addition, ethnic tensions in- 
creased as a result of the policies of the first 
independent Ukrainian government which 
chose to promote the Ukrainian language and 
culture. 
In 1993 ethnic tensions reached their high- 
est point when the leadership of the Russian 
enclave in Crimea took a course toward unifi- 
cation with the Russian Federation. As the po- 
litical conflict between Kiev and Crimea esca- 
lated, ethnic tensions between Ukrainians and 
Russians increased, especially in Sevastopol city 
where the Russian Black Sea fleet is based. Mili- 
tary skirmishes between the Ukrainian and Rus- 
sian paramilitaries were avoided only through 
last minute negotiations (Kuzio 1994). 
Pro-Russian sentiments were also on the rise 
in the highly Russified regions of Donetsk and 
Luhansk in eastern Ukraine. The leadership in 
these regions in 1994 organized a consultative 
referendum. The plebiscite produced massive 
Soc ia l ines  t a p a t y b e s  k l a u s i m a i  
votes in the region in favor of closer ties with 
Russia and the CIS, as well as limiting the 
gradual Ukrainization of these regions (RFEI 
RL Daily Report, 24 and 29 March, 1994). How- 
ever, tensions in eastern Ukraine had not 
reached as high a point as in Crimea because 
Kiev pursued accomodationist policies and did 
address the complaints of the restless regions. 
Since the 1994 elections, ethnic tensions in 
Ukraine have declined (Shaw 1994). This oc- 
curred, in large part, because the elites from the 
Russified eastern Ukraine were able to defeat 
representatives of western Ukraine in the na- 
tional elections. The new administration mod- 
erated the nationality policies of the previous 
government and pursued greater cooperation 
with the Russian Federation. 
In sum, since late 1980s there was forma- 
tion of the consociational regime in Ukraine. 
Unlike in the "classical" cases of 
consociationalism (e.g., Belgium, Switzerland, 
Lebanon [until 19751) in which power among 
ethnic and/or religious groups is shared through 
mutual vetoes, grand coalition government or 
proportional division of government and bu- 
reaucratic posts), consociationalism in Ukraine 
is not legally codified. Instead power is shared 
through delicate coalitions between represen- 
tatives of nationalist West and Russified and 
more conservative Eastern part of Ukraine. 
Will there continue to be a periodical rise 
in Ukrainian - Russians tensions will depend on 
the variety of factors. First of all, it will depend 
on capacity of Ukrainian elites resist the long 
term and gradual tendencies towards 
"nativization" of the Ukrainian state. Second, 
it will depend on a evolution of relationships 
between Ukraine and Russian Federation. As 
the developments during the first post-indepen- 
dence years show, liberal nationality policies 
pursued by the Kiev are not enough to preserve 
ethnic stability in Ukraine. The establishment 
of close economic, social and cultural relation- 
ships between Crimea and eastern Ukraine and 
the Russian Federation are also necessary. 
Conclusion 
The collapse of the Communist regime in 
Moscow initiated a complex and protracted pro- 
cess of ethnic transformation throughout the vast 
periphery of the former USSR. In all the suc- 
cessor states institutions that promoted and sus- 
tained Russian political, economic and cultural 
domination declined. In their place new institu- 
tions and mechanisms regulating the access of 
people of different nationalities to power, re- 
sources and prestige have been developed. 
This paper identified three major character- 
istics of the process of ethnic transformation. 
First, there were significant differences in the 
outcomes of ethnic transformation across the 
former periphery of the USSR. These outcomes 
varied from the creation of ethnocratic regimes 
in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, to 
ethnic democracies in the Baltics, and a 
consociationalism in Ukraine. A second feature 
of the transformation of the imperial ethnic or- 
der was its changing 'trajectories.' In Moldova 
attempts to impose ethnic hegemony of 
Moldovans were abandoned, and instead, liberal 
nationality policies were promoted. In the Baltics 
the ethnic transformation process fluctuated 
between the predominance of civic versus eth- 
nic nationalism. In Central Asia transformation 
proceeded in the tensions between promotion 
of ethnocratic, as well as consociational features. 
In Ukraine there was development of the 
consociationalism. Finally, ethnic transforma- 
tion was profoundly shaped by developments in 
the Russian Federation and Moscow's policies 
toward the new states. 
Prevailing approaches in the study of ethnic 
transformation in the ex-Soviet republics proved 
to be of weak explanatory power when dealing 
with a rapid process of fragmentation and dif- 
ferentiation of a previously unified geopolitical 
space. This is because such approaches are based 
on an analysis of the degree to which institutions 
created in new states deviate from the liberal- 
democratic ideal. While such deviational ap- 
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proaches worked reasonably well while the So- 
viet Union was still intact, their usefulness de- 
clined significantly once the USSR collapsed. 
Under the dramatically changed circumstances, 
deviational models could not account for the 
different outcomes of the process of ethnic 
transformation, nor for the varied dynamics of 
ethnic change. 
The approach presented here is based on 
the use of a much more nuanced analysis of the 
varied conditions of the successor states, includ- 
ing those influenced by the Russian Federation. 
It enabled to provide a systemic description of 
the multiple patterns of ethnic transformation 
as they evolved across the periphery of the 
former USSR. In addition, instead of using 
generalized explanations and prognostication, 
as is the case with deviational approaches, the 
proposed model remains open ended. It is be- 
cause the new ethnic orders in the successor 
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Notes 
' In this paper ethnic group is defined as a group of 
people who "are, or  feel themselves, o r  are thought to be, 
bound by common ties of race or  nationality or  culture 
sharing language, culture, religion, or  other cultural val- 
ues and practices" (Morris 1968, p. 167). Ethnic stratifi- 
cation is used to denote unequal access to power, resources 
and status among individuals of different ethnic origins. 
Ethnic stratification is achieved through, and stabilized 
by, institutions, laws, norms, and values. Ethnic transfor- 
mation is defined as the process by which legal, political, 
economic and social institutions upholding an ethnic or- 
der in a society, are replaced by new social institutions. 
These new institutions formalize and stabilize the changes 
that occurred in access to power, resources and prestige, 
among individuals of different ethnic origins. In the case 
of the new states of the former USSR these elements of 
the new ethnic order are: a constitution that defines citi- 
zenship in the new states; legislation on languages that 
regulated the use of the titular and Russian languages in 
the territory of the republics; regulations on residency 
permits; participation in the privatization process; partici- 
pation in elections; access to housing; access to govern- 
ment employment (including the National Armies and 
Police); and, access to education and other social welfare 
services. 
With independence the "Soviet Socialist Republic 
of Moldavia" was renamed into the  "Republic of 
Moldova." 
' In 1989 Soviet census the number of ethnic Rus- 
sians was determined according to the subjective ethnic 
identification or  affiliation (natsional'nost') of a respon- 
dent. Therefore in this paper term 'Russians'will be used 
for convenience understanding that i t  also includes other 
Russophones (first of all Ukrainians and Byelorussians) 
whom in the 1989 census identified themselves as ethnic 
Russians. For more on how categories of ethnicity and 
nationality were defined in the 1989 Soviet Census see 
Anderson and Silver, 1989. 
In Estonia residents non-citizens (predominant ma- 
jority of whom were ethnic Russians) were eligible to vote 
in local but not in a national elections. More on policies 
of citizenship in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania see 
Brubaker (1992), Bunga et al., (1992) and Smith et al., 
(1994). 
"n Estonia all Soviet era settlers (with the exception 
of former Soviet military personnel) were eligible for citi- 
zenship, provided they passed the language proficiency 
test and took an oath of loyalty to the Estonian republic. 
In Latvia, the requirements for citizenship are more com- 
plicated and restrictive. However, beginning with the year 
2003, all individuals who moved to Latvia during the So- 
viet era will be eligible for citizenship, providing they pass 
a language proficiency test and take an oath of loyalty to 
the Latvian republic (Smith et al. 1994). 
Soldiers of the 14Ih Russian Army stationed in 
Moldova were not outsiders in the Chisinau - Transnistria 
conflict. Russian soldiers often tended to be locals with 
on-going close personal and social relationships between 
conscripts and local population (Socor 1993). Currently 
Russian military in Moldova is represented not only by 
the 14Ih Russian Army, but also by a contingent of Rus- 
sian soldiers within the trilateral (Russian, Ukrainian and 
Moldovan) peacekeeping force (Globe 1997). 
' The negotiations began over the creation of two 
national-territorial units within Moldovan state: the 
Transdniester, in which ethnic Russians and Ukrainians 
constituted a numerical majority (about 52% of the popu- 
lation of the region) and the Gagauz region inhabited by 
the Gagauz minority (a Christian Turkic group) (Socor 
1992a; 1992~). 
T h e  exact nature of this conflict is debated. 
Moldovan leadership as well as some commentators see 
confrontation between Chisinau and Transnistria as a po- 
litical conflict, in which ethnicity is of secondary impor- 
tance. In such interpretation Moldovan side is represented 
by pro-reform leadership which is currently pursuing lib- 
eral nationality policies directed towards creation of ter- 
ritorially based Moldovan nation. Transdniester side in a 
political confrontation is represented by hard-line Com- 
munists, military-industrial interests of Russia and civil 
and military officials who want to preserve centralized and 
state run enterprises on which the economy of this terri- 
tory is based. The Communists and other patriotic forces 
in Russia as well as leadership of Transdniester Republic 
see the confrontation with ~ h i s i n a u  as first of all an eth- 
nic conflict. In such interpretation, Transdniester's lead- 
ership is fighting against t h e  ethnic  hegemony of 
Moldovans, whom are threatening not only to convert eth- 
nic Russians and Ukrainians into a "sec-ohd class" citi- 
zens but also to  forcefully assimilate the$ into the 
Moldovan ethnos (Socor 1992b). Majority of the ana- 
lysts, however, see the Chisinau - Transdniester confron- 
tation as ethno-political conflict in which two,&cipient 
ethnic societies are struggling for the control over the 
Moldovan state (Crowther 1997; Fane 1993; Kolsto 1993). 
Uzbek intellectuals had managed to create a siz- 
able popular movement, the Birlik (Unity), which was 
highly influential during the later partperesfroika. At the 
peak of its activities the Birlik claimed a membership of 
approximately 500,000 individuals (Olcott 1996, p.115). 
The Birlik was created following the example of similar 
organizations in the Baltics to promote the protection of 
Uzbek culture and language and to increase the autonomy 
of Uzbekistan vis-4-vis Moscow. The Uzbek intelligen- 
tsia was successful in mobilizing political opposition, in 
part, because the Uzbek capital, Tashkent, was a hub of 
the region with a large concentration of the scientific, 
educational and industrial potential of the Central Asia. 
S o c i a l i n e s  t a p a t y b e s  k l a u s i m a i  
Political mobilization was also facilitated by the fact that 
two great historic centers of Islamic culture, Samarkand 
and Bukhara, both of which are considered foundations 
of Turkic identity, a r e  located in the  terr i tory of 
Uzbekistan. Finally, by the late 1980s the Uzbek Com- 
munist leadership's grip on the republic was weaker than 
in the other Central Asian countries. This happened be- 
cause Moscow purged hundreds of the highest Uzbek 
Communist officials implicated in a massive corruption 
and bribery scandal in the republic's cotton industry 
(Fierman, 1997; Starr, 1996). 
lo The term 'state patronage' is used here to denote 
the fact that ethnic Russians in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan were accorded political and cultural rights 
far exceeding those of the other ethnic minorities in lhese 
states. 
l 1  In 1994,28% of the Kazakhstani parliament were 
ethnic Russians (they comprise 38% of the population) 
(RFEIRL Daily Report, March 19, 1994). In 1995, in the 
Kazakhstani government, there were 9 non-Kazakh min- 
isters (out of 21); 7 heads of regions (out of 19) are non- 
Kazakhs; and in 5,000 of the country's high schools (out 
of 8,500) teaching is conducted in Russian. The Russian 
language is the ling~ta franca of the country's mass media, 
and is the official state language (Makarov 1995). 
l 2  Under the notion of "clan" it is understood infor- 
mal networks of nepotism, clientism and patronage the 
members of which are united by the blood, marriage and 
territorial origins. Kazakhstan is currently dominated by 
the representatives of the Kazakh Greater Horde, while 
in Kyrgyzstan representatives of the North (Naryn - Issyk- 
Kul') are holding the power in Bishkek (Kobischanov 
1994; Rashidov 1992). 
l 3  Abolition of ethnic hierarchy does not mean that 
there is evolution of the liberal democracy in Ukraine, 
although relevant institutions and legislation are existent 
(if no t  necessarily effective). Arguably,  the 
consociationalism in Ukraine is taking a form of state- 
corporatism in which key economic and interest groups 
closely tied to the old system-command system are lobby- 
ing the state for resources and protection. Because of the 
struggle among different corporate groups, central gov- 
ernment in Kiev is paralyzed, reforms are slow. Corrup- 
tion, patronage and regionalism are widespread. How- 
ever, unlike in Central Asia Ukrainian networks of pa- 
tronage are of a different character. In Central Asia ter- 
ritorially based "clans" are organized along blood, mar- 
riage and ethnic lines. In Ukraine networks of patronage 
and nepotism are based not so much on ascriptive charac- 
teristics of their members, as on the "functional" criteria, 
such as sector of'economy (e.g., political party of Agrar- 
ians representing largely unreformed agricultural estab- 
lishment of the country) and class (e.g. Ukrainian Union 
of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs which unites most of 
the business organizations and directors of the state own 
enterprises; Ukrainian Trade Unions which represents pre- 
dominant majority of the Ukrainians workers in this coun- 
try; the Communist party of Ukraine that represents the 
members of the former Communist nomenclature). More 
on corporatism in Ukraine see Kubicek (1996). 
l4 Crimea is a Black sea peninsula that in 1954 was 
transferred from Russia to Ukraine. Its population is 2.7 
million, 75% of which are ethnic Russians (Usov 1996). 
,- 
I' It is estimated 45 to70 percent of ethnic Russians 
(depending on a particular administrative region) voted 
for Ukraine's independence from the SSR (Kolstoe 
1995; Kuzio 1994). Y 
